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BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a declaratory judgment proceeding commenced by 
the natural father of a child born out of wedlock to determine 
his rights in relation to said child. The father sought a 
determination first, that his consent, absent a judicial 
termination of his parental rights, is an essential pre-
requisite to any adoption of the child, and second, that the 
mother had released all her rights in relation to the child, 
and that he was therefore entitled to custody of the child. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On November 11, 1974 the Fourth Judicial District Court 
of the State of Utah, in and for Utah County, Allen B. Sorensen, 
presiding, issued a Temporary Restraining Order and Order to 
Show Cause restraining the Appellants from going forward with 
any adoption proceeding involving said child. On November 15, 
1974 the Court issued a preliminary injunction requiring that 
all adoption proceedings involving said child abate and remain 
in a status quo position pending determination of Respondent's 
rights in relation to said child. On December 19, 1974, the 
-1-
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matter came on for trial. After a conference in chambers with 
counsel, the Court bifurcated the issues, and an evidentiary 
hearing proceeded on the sole issue of whether or not the Respondent 
as the natural father, has rights in relation to the child such 
that his consent is required for an adoption, absent proper pro-
ceedings to terminate any such rights. The Court reserved all 
issues with regard to custody for hearing at a later date. 
The Court determined that the Respondent is the natural 
father of the child, that he has publicly acknowledged the child, 
and that he has rights in relation to said child within the 
meaning and purview of §78-30-4, Utah Code Annotated, as amended 
(1973 Supp.)> and, unless his parental rights are terminated 
as provided by law, his consent to the adoption of said child 
is required. 
The Court permanently enjoined the Appellants, and each 
of them, from proceeding in any way with the adoption of the 
child without the prior written consent of the Respondent. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellants seek reversal of the trial court's 
Judgment, issued January 9, 1975, in which they were permanently 
enjoined from proceeding in any way with the adoption of baby 
girl H •_ _ _ without the prior consent of the Respondent. 
The Respondent seeks affirmance. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondent, TAAMU MELEISEA, and Appellant, JANA 
HOPE, are the natural parents of baby girl H , born 
October 25, 1974 in Salt Lake City, Utah. (Tr. 21) Said child 
was conceived and born out of wedlock. At the time of the 
baby's birth the Respondent was in the process of obtaining a 
divorce from his wife. (Tr. 17) The Appellant JANA HOPE is 
a single woman. 
When the Respondent was informed by the Appellant JANA HOPE 
of the pregnancy he readily acknowledged his paternity and made 
an offer to either marry the Appellant after his divorce 
became final or, at her option, to provide support for the 
child. (Tr. 17) Appellant JANA HOPE refused to marry the 
Respondent upon his divorce becoming final, but did accept 
some nominal financial assistance from the Plaintiff during 
her pregnancy. (Tr. 17, 53, 54) 
In approximately April, 1974, (prior to the birth of 
the child), Appellant JANA HOPE contacted Appellant L.D.S. 
SOCIAL SERVICES for the purpose of placing the child with that 
agency for adoption. Once Appellant JANA HOPE had been 
accepted as a client of the agency she adopted an assumed name 
for the purpose of avoiding unnecessary notoriety regarding 
the pregnancy. (Tr. 33) Knowledge of her whereabouts during 
the pregnancy was kept from the Respondent. (Tr. 41) 
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Shortly before the baby was born, Appellant L.D.S. 
SOCIAL SERVICES sent the Respondent a letter indicating that 
Appellant JANA HOPE had alleged his paternity of the ex-
pected child and requested that he contact their office if he 
had any interest in the child. (Tr. 18, Rec, 34, Plaintiff's 
Exhibit No. 2) 
Immediately upon receipt of said letter, the Respondent 
made an appointment with and went to the office of Ramona 
Rasmussen, an agent of Appellant L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES assigned 
as a case worker for Appellant JANA HOPE and baby girl H . 
Said meeting occurred on or about October 16, 1974. (Tr. 18, 
19, 36) At said meeting Respondent readily acknowledged 
his paternity of the child. (Tr. 19, 36) The Respondent ex-
pressed an interest in obtaining custody of the child. (Tr. 19) 
When informed of the mother's request that the child be placed 
with a family for adoption, the Respondent informed Mrs. 
Rasmussen that his married sister and brother-in-law would 
like to adopt the child. (Tr. 19, 20, 43, 44) Respondent was 
informed by the SOCIAL SERVICES that neither he nor his relatives 
could be considered as prospective adoptive parents, but that 
he had a right to a court hearing prior to any such adoption. 
(Tr, 20, 43) The SOCIAL SERVICES then requested Respondent to 
sign a written consent to adoption form. The Respondent refused 
and claimed rights in the child and informed the SOCIAL SERVICES 
that he intended to seek legal advice regarding his rights. 
(Tr, 20) 
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Shortly thereafter and before the baby was born, the 
Respondent contacted legal counsel, who, in turn, contacted 
Appellant L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES and informed that agency 
that the Respondent, as the natural father of the expected 
child, claimed rights in relation to said child and that the 
Respondent would seek judicial enforcement of those rights 
if adoption proceedings were commenced without his prior 
consent (Tr. 39) 
Three days after the birth of baby girl H , on 
October 28, 1974, Appellant JANA HOPE executed a written con-
sent to adoption form and thereby placed the child for adoption 
with Appellant L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES. (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3) 
On October 31, 1974, Appellant L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES, 
by and through Mrs. Rasmussen, again had contact with the 
Respondent relative to the possible adoption of the child. (Tr. 
20, 21) At this meeting Respondent again expressed an interest 
in the child and requested custody of the child. (Tr. 47, 48) 
The Respondent offered to pay the medical bills occasioned by 
the pregnancy and birth and requested information as to the 
condition and whereabouts of the child. (Tr. 22) The Appellant 
L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES refused his request for custody and 
refused to disclose the whereabouts of the child. (Tr. 22, 41) 
The Respondent again requested that his. sister and brother-in-law 
be considered as prospective adoptive parents but L.D.S. SOCIAL 
SERVICES informed him that that was against their policy. 
(Tr. 48) Respondent was again asked to execute a written form 
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consenting to placement of the child for adoption, but 
Respondent refused to give his consent and claimed a right 
to the child. (Tr. 23) 
Baby girl H _ has, since October 28, 1974, been in 
the custody of Appellant L,DeSc SOCIAL SERVICES. Despite 
the knowledge on the part of Appellant L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES 
of the natural fatherss claim to the child and both his avowed 
intent to seek judicial determination of his rights, and their 
promise to him that the issue would be decided in the courts, 
said Appellant L.D.S, SOCIAL SERVICES placed the child with 
prospective adoptive parents without the consent or knowledge 
of the natural father. 
On November 11, 1974 Respondent filed this declaratory 
judgment proceeding seeking determination of his rights as 
a natural parent in relation to baby girl H
 t under 
§78-30-4, Utah Code Annotated, as amended (1973 Supp.). 
Respondent, in support of a Temporary Restraining Order in 
this action, filed an Affidavit acknowledging his paternity 
of the child and claiming rights in relation to said child. 
(Rec, 34, Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1) 
The Fourth Judicial District Court of the State of Utah, 
in and for Utah County, Allen B. Sorensen presiding, on 
November 11, 1974 issued a Temporary Restraining Order and 
Order to Show Cause restraining the Defendants from going 
forward with any adoption proceeding involving baby girl 
H Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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On November 15, 1974 the Court issued a preliminary 
injunction requiring that all adoption proceedings involving 
baby girl H _ abate and remain in a status quo position 
pending determination of Respondents rights in relation to 
said childc (Rec. 17) 
\ The matter came on for trial on December 19, 1974. After 
a conference in chambers, the Court bifurcated the issues, 
and proceeded with an evidentiary hearing on the sole issue 
of whether or not Respondent, as the natural father, has 
rights in relation to the child such that his consent is re-
quired for an adoption, absent proper proceedings to terminate 
any such rights. The Court reserved all issues with regard 
to custody for hearing at a later date. 
In a memorandum decision dated January 2, 1975, the Court 
held that there was no dispute as to material facts, and that 
the Respondent was entitled to the relief sought as a matter of 
law, and entered judgment accordingly. (Rec. 15) 
On January 9, 1975, the Court issued its findings, con-
clusions, and judgment, prepared by counsel for the Respondent. 
(Rec. 23) The Court determined that the Respondent is the 
natural father of baby girl H , that he has publicly 
acknowledged the child as his own, and that he has rights in 
relation to said child within the meaning and purview of 
§78-30-4, Utah Code Annotated, as amended (1973 Supp.). The 
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Court further held that, unless the Respondent's parental 
rights are terminated as provided by law, his consent to any 
adoption of the child is required. The Court therefore, 
permanently enjoined the Appellants, and each of them, 
from proceeding in any way with the adoption of the child 
without the prior written consent of the Respondent, (Rec, 25) 
POINT I 
THE LAW NOW RECOGNIZES THE PARENT-CHILD RELATION-
SHIP BETWEEN AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD AND ITS PUTATIVE 
FATHER, AND UNDER RECENT U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
APPLYING THE RULE IN STANLEY v. ILLINOIS, CONSENT TO 
AN ADOPTION OF THE ILLEGITIMATE CHILD MUST BE OBTAINED 
FROM THE PUTATIVE FATHER, PURSUANT TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
GUARANTEES OF DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION. 
At common law: nullius filius. Traditionally, the legal 
relationship between a natural father and his illegitimate 
child reflected a callous indifference toward the rights of 
the father. Under the English common law of inheritance, an 
illegitimate child was nullius filius - "no man's son." 
1, !TBastards are incapable of being heirs — Such 
are held to be sons of nobody, nulius filii, 
and they have no inheritable blood. Hence, if 
there be no other claimant than such illegiti-
mate children, the land shall escheat to the 
lord." BLACKSTONEfS COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW, 
368 (B. Ganit, Ed., 1892). 
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Although the original English doctrine applied only to matters 
involving inheritance, early American common law expanded it 
into a complete disassociation of the natural father and his 
child -- the child now belonged to "no man" for any and all 
purposes. 
Most American courts adopted the position that the 
putative father had no legally cognizable connection with 
his illegitimate child beyond the moral obligation to provide 
support. Some jurisdictions, however, went so far as to deny 
the illegitimate child any right of support, recognition or 
2 
inheritance from the father. This common law disinheritance 
was eventually modified by statute in most jurisdictions, 
however, and the original doctrine of nullius filius has 
o 
become extinct in this country. 
Modern legal recognitition of the parent-child relationship. 
Gradually, American law has begun to recognize a relationship 
between the putative father and his illegitimate offspring. 
Although the mother generally obtains custody of the child, 
the natural father has been awarded rights of visitation, 
even where the mother opposes the visits. If the natural 
2. In Re Lund's Estate, 26 Cal.2d 472, 480, 159 P.2d 
643, 648 (1945). 
3. See, e.g., §§74-4-10, 74-4-11, Utah Code Annotated. 
4. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 56 Misc. 2d 711, 289 N.Y.S.2d 
792 (Fam. Ct., Kings Co. 1968); Mixon v. Mize, 198 So. 2d 373 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Pennsylvania v. Rozanski, 206 Pa. 
Super. 897, 213 A.2d 155 (1965); Strong v. Owens, 91 Cal. App. 
336, 205 P.2d 48 (Dist. Ct. App. 1949); Ex parte Hendrix, 186 
Okla. 712, 100 P.2d 444 (1940); Baker v. Baker, 81 N.J. Eq. 
135, 85 A. 816 (Ch. 1913). See also Tabler, Paternal Rights 
in the Illegitimate Child: Some Legitimate Complaints on Behalf 
of the Unwed Father, 11 J. Fam. L. 231 (1971). 
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mother died, or if she abandoned the child, the putative father 
has been allowed standing to seek a judicial award of custody. 
The father has also been given the power to legitimize and 
adopt the child. 
The illegitimate child itself has also begun to receive 
judicial recognition. The United States Supreme Court has 
recently held unconstitutional a statute which deprived an 
illegitimate child of the right to sue for the wrongful death 
6 
of its natural mother, as well as a statute which prohibited 
the natural mother from maintaining an action for the wrongful 
death of an illegitimate child. In both cases, the Court 
held that under the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, illegitimate children cannot be treated differently 
from those born in wedlock. 
Adoption procedures prior to Stanley. With regard to 
the adoption of an illegitimate child, however, almost every 
jurisdiction has traditionally refused to required the natural 
father*s consent as a prerequisite. In Utah, for example, 
prior to amendment of the statute in 1966, the consent provision 
5. See, e.g., §§74-4-10, 77-60-14, 78-30-12, Utah Code 
Annotated. 
6. Glona v. American Guarantee Co., 391 U.S. 73, 
20 L. Ed. 2d 441, 88 S. Ct. 1515 (1968). 
7. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 20 L. Ed. 2d 436, 
88 S. Ct. 1509 (1968). 
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8 
omitted the putative father as a necessary consenting party. 
Most similarly-worded statutes were construed to mean that the 
9 
natural mother's consent to the adoption was sufficient. The 
constitutionality of Utah's pre-1966 consent statute was 
challenged in our Supreme Court in 1961. The Court upheld the 
statute, recognizing and perpetuating what was then the majority 
rule of law: 
ffThe putative father of an illegitimate child 
occupies no recognized paternal status at common 
law or under our statutes. The law does not 
recognize him at all, except that it will make 
him pay for the child's maintenance if it can 
find out who he is. The only father it recognizes 
as having any rights is the father of a legitimate 
child."10 
Nevertheless, a few courts have begun to recognize that, 
coexistent with the putative father's obligations in relation 
to the child, a natural unwed father has some rights in re-
lation to his illegitimate child which cannot be totally 
8. "A legitimate child cannot be adopted without the 
consent of its parents, if living, nor an illegiti-
mate child without the consent of its mother." 
§78-30-4, Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
9. The Oregon statute, for example, specifically states 
that: 
"The consent of the mother of the [illegitimate] 
child is sufficient . . . and for all purposes 
relating to the adoption of the child the father 
of the child shall be disregarded, just as if he 
were dead." Ore. Rev. Code §109.326 (1969). 
10. Thomas v. Children's Aid Society of Ogden, 12 Utah 2d 
235, 364 P.2d 1029, 1031-32 (1961). 
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ignored. To deny the sirehood and paternity of an illegitimate 
child is to deny a biological fact and indulge in a fiction. 
The biological bond exists regardless of whether or not the 
11 
law chooses to recognize it, 
Stanley v. Illinois. A major turning point in the law 
came in 1972, with the United States Supreme Court decision 
12 
in Stanley v. Illinois. Although Stanley did not specifically 
involve an adoption proceeding, it has had a vitally important 
impact on the status of putative fathers in hearings and pro-
ceedings regarding their illegitimate children. 
Peter Stanley lived with Joan Stanley intermittently for 
18 years, during which time they had three children, although 
they never married. When Joan died, the three children were 
declared wards of the state and placed with court-appointed 
guardians. As an unwed father, Peter Stanley was not a "parent" 
under Illinois statutes, and consequently was not entitled to 
a hearing as to the children's dependency or his fitness as 
a parent. Although Illinois lav; afforded such a hearing to 
married fathers and mothers, and to unwed mothers, unwed fathers 
such as Stanley were presumed unfit. 
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that the 
Illinois procedure of denying the putative father the same 
11. One court has stated: n . . . certainly to the 
illegitimate child, the father is never putative." Commonwealth 
v, Rozanski, 206 Pa, Super. 397, 213 A.2d 155, 157 (1965). 
12. 405 U.S. 645, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551, 92 S. Ct. 1208 (1972). 
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procedures and rights afforded married couples and unwed mothers 
13 14 
violated both the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses 
of the U.S. Constitution. 
Impact of Stanley on adoption procedures. Although the 
specific facts in Stanley involved a custody proceeding, the 
Court suggested that the rationale of the decision applied 
15 
equally to adoption proceedings. Any doubt as to the 
13. "[The State of Illinois] insists on presuming rather 
than proving Stanley's unfitness solely because it 
is more convenient to presume than to prove. Under 
the Due Process Clause, that advantage is insufficient 
to justify refusing a father a hearing when the issue 
at stake is the dismemberment of his family." 405 U.S. 
at 658. 
14. "The State of Illinois assumes custody of the children 
of married parents, divorced parents, and unmarried 
mothers only after a hearing and proof of neglect. 
The children of unmarried fathers, however, are de-
clared dependent children without a hearing on parental 
fitness and without proof of neglect. Stanley's claim 
in the state courts and here is that failure to afford 
him a hearing on his parental qualifications while 
extending it to other parents denied him equal protection 
of the laws. We have concluded that all Illinois parents 
are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fit-
ness before their children are removed from their custody. 
It follows that denying such a hearing to Stanley and 
those like him while granting it to other Illinois 
parents is inescapably contrary to the Equal Protection 
Clause." Id. 
15. "We note in passing that the incremental cost of offering 
unwed fathers an opportunity for individualized hearings 
on fitness appears to be minimal. If unwed fathers, in 
the main, do not care about the disposition of their 
children, they will not appear to demand hearing. If 
they do care, under the scheme here held invalid, 
Illinois would admittedly at some later time have to 
afford them a properly focused hearing in a custody 
or adoption proceeding." (emphasis added) 405 U.S. at 
657, n. 9. 
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applicability of Stanley to adoption proceedings was immedi-
ately dispelled when, only two weeks later, the Supreme 
16 
Court decided Eothstein v. Lutheran Social Services. In 
that case, an illegitimate child had been placed with adoptive 
parents within two weeks after its birth. Although the 
parental rights of the mother had been terminated through her 
consent, the unwed father had not been notified of the adoption 
proceedings, and had not given his consent to termination of 
his parental rights. The Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to 
recognize any parental rights in the unwed father, or the 
necessity of obtaining his consent. The Wisconsin high court 
indicated that its decision was based on the reasoning of the 
earlier Utah case, Thomas v. Children9s Aid Society: 
Because of the apparent similarity between the 
Utah and the Wisconsin [adoption] statutes 
and the different definitions in [sic] set forth 
under statutes in other jurisdictions, we think 
the reasoning of the Thomas Case can be applied 
to the instant case,16a 
Then, quoting directly from the Thomas case the rule laid 
down by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Eothstein incorporated 
by this reference, the rule of the Thomas case; 
16. 405 U.S. 1051, 92 S. Ct. 1488, 31 L. Ed.. 2d 786 
(1972). 
16a. State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services, 
47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56, 63 (1970). 
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However, plaintiffs argue that if the statute 
requires only the consent of the mother of an 
illegitimate child, and not that of the father, 
it is unconstitutional because fit authorizes 
a private individual to deprive another individual 
of his natural, statutory, and constitutional rights 
without a hearing of any kind.f This poses the 
question as to whether the rights of a father, 
if any he has, to his illegitimate child come within 
the purview of the due process clause and various 
other provisions of the State and Federal Consti-
tutions. We think not. The claim of the plaintiffs 
is based upon the theory of a chattel ownership 
of the child, but no such right is capable of 
legal recognition. The putative father of an 
illegitimate child occupies no recognized paternal 
status at common law or under our statutes. The 
law does not recognize him at all, except that 
it will make him pay for the child's maintenance 
if it can find out who he is. The only father it 
recognizes as having any rights is the father of 
a legitimate child.^ -^ b 
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded 
the case for further consideration in light of Stanley. 
It is important for purposes of the present proceeding to 
note that in so ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court effectively 
reversed the reasoning of the Utah court in Thomas v. Children's 
Aid Society. 
On remand, the Wisconsin Supreme Court declared the 
Wisconsin adoption procedures unconstitutional, and in-
terpreted Stanley to mean: 
16b. Id. 
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(1) That the denial of a natural father's 
parental rights to a child born out of wedlock 
based on mere illegitimacy violated his constitu-
tional right to equal protection of the laws, 
and (2) that the termination of a natural father's 
parental rights to a child born out of wedlock 
without actual notice to him, if he was known, or 
constructive notice, if unknown, and without giving 
him the right to be heard on the termination of 
his rights denied him due process of law.-'-' 
The Wisconsin Court then declared the adoption void because the 
father's rights had not been properly terminated, and indicated 
that in the future all natural fathers must be given notice 
of adoption proceedings, but left solution of the procedural 
problems to the legislature* 
Only one (1) month after the Wisconsin Court decided 
Rothstein, the Illinois Supreme Court had occasion to interpret 
the effect of its own decision in Stanley on Illinois adoption 
18 
procedures. In Slawek v. Covenant Children9s Uome> a child 
had been placed for adoption with the consent of the mother 
only. The putative father appealed, arguing that the adoption 
agency knew he was the father, and had finalized the adoption 
without notice to him and without his consent. The Illinois 
Supreme Court held: 
17. 59 Wis.2d 1, 207 N.W.2d 826, 828 (1973) 
18. 52 111.2d 20, 284 N.E.2d 291 (1972). 
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The United States Supreme Court has recently 
held that state laws which deny hearing to 
determine the fitness of a father for the 
custody of his children born out of wedlock 
while extending this right to other parents 
are based upon an unreasonable distinction 
and violate equal protection principles . . . 
The Court recognized that the interests of 
the father of an illegitimate child are no 
different from those of other parents. 
The Court then went on to state: 
The provisions of the adoption and paternity 
acts are unconstitutional insofar as they 
are in conflict with Stanley, Rothstein and 
Vanderlaan, (284N.E.2d at 292) 
Five (5) months after Stanleys a New York court allowed 
a putative father to oppose an adoption proceeding, notwith-
standing a statute prohibiting such a contest, noting that 
the New York statutes were substantially similar to the Illinois 
statutes previously held unconstitutional under the reasoning 
19 
of Stanley. In Doe v. Department of Social Services, the 
New York court declared that henceforth the New York adoption 
statutes ". . « must be construed [to mean] that the mother's 
exclusive or sole consent suffices only where there has been 
no formal or unequivocal acknowledgment or recognition of 
paternity by the father." 337 N.Y.S.2d at 107, 
Implementing the Stanley rule. Implementation of the 
Stanley rule in adoption proceedings was immediate in several 
jurisdictions. As a result of Stanley and Slawek, the Illinois 
Attorney General issued an opinion that consent to an adoption 
19. 77 Misc. 2d 666, 337 N.Y.S.2d 102 (Sup. Ct. 1972). 
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must be obtained from the putative father. If he refuses 
to give his consent, or is unknown, he must be made a party 
defendant in the adoption proceedings. According to an article 
in the Illinois Bar Journal, all unwed fathers must be given 
20 
notice and an opportunity to be heard at adoption proceedings. 
The Washington Attorney General also issued an opinion to the 
effect that many of that statefs adoption proceedings were 
21 
unconstitutional. Finally, in response to Stanley, new 
adoption statutes were quickly passed in Washington, Wisconsin, 
Michigan and Colorado (see APPENDIX). 
The current state of the law. In October, 1972, repre-
sentatives of the American Bar Association and the Child 
Welfare League of America met to discuss the implications 
of the Stanley decision for the child welfare field. As a 
result of that conference, the Child Welfare League adopted 
the following position: 
At the present time there is no unanimity as to 
the constitutionally required legal rights of 
fathers of children born out of wedlock. There 
are those who hold that all known fathers must 
be notified as part of any action to terminate 
parental rights, whether voluntary or judicial. 
Others hold that only fathers who have formally 
or informally acknowledged paternity need to 
be notified. 
20. 61 111. Bar J. 378, 379 (1973), citing 1972 Op. Atty. 
Gen. 542 (1972). 
21c WASH. OP. ATTY. GEN., Unpublished Memorandum No. 72-227, 
Dec. 7, 1972. 
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The Child Welfare League of America recognizes 
that until the legal position is clarified it 
would be safer, from a legal standpoint, to 
notify all known fathers.22 
From these developments, the trend in the law is clear. 
Until the parent-child relationship is severed, and the puta-
tive father's rights are terminated in a judicial proceeding 
in which the father is given the fair hearing required by the 
Due Process Clause, unwed fathers may not be treated differently 
from other parents under the Equal Protection Clause, and there-
fore the consent of a putative father who acknowledges paternity 
is required before an illegitimate child may be adopted. Numerous 
states have now incorporated this rule into their adoption 
statutes (see APPENDIX). 
Application to the instant case. In the present case, 
the Respondent father's rights in relation to baby girl H 
have not been terminated, either voluntarily or in any judicial 
proceeding. It is undisputed that the Respondent has at all 
times publicly acknowledged his paternity. The rule of con-
stitutional law laid down by the United States Supreme Court 
in Stanley therefore compels affirmance of the ruling of the 
trial court in this case that the Respondent's consent to 
placement of baby girl H for adoption is required, unless 
his parental rights are terminated as provided by law. 
22. Comment, Protecting the Putative Father's Rights After 
Stanley v. Illinois: Problems in Implementation^ 13 J. Fam. Law 
115, 135 & n. 101. 
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POINT II 
UNDER UTAH LAW, THE PUTATIVE FATHER OF AN 
ILLEGITIMATE CHILD HAS CUSTODY RIGHTS WHICH CONSTI-
TUTE HIM "A PARENT HAVING RIGHTS IN RELATION TO SAID 
CHILD11 FOR PURPOSES OF §78-30-4, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
AS AMENDED (1973 SUPPC). 
In 1970f the Utah Supreme Court decided a case which is 
remarkably similar to Stanley* and is a tribute to the foresight 
and wisdom of our Court, inasmuch as it preceded Stanley by two 
23 
years. As in Stanley * the Utah decision in In Re M involved 
a custody proceeding rather than an adoption, but also like 
Stanleys that appears to be a distinction without a difference. 
In In Re Ms one James Thomas was the natural father of an 
illegitimate child. Three days after its birth, the baby was 
removed from the hospital on a warrant issued by the juvenile court 
alleging that the child was neglected and dependent, that Thomas 
was the putative father, that the mother had expressed a desire 
to relinquish custody and was severely emotionally disturbed, and 
that therefore the child should be in the care and custody of 
the State Department of Public Welfare. At a hearing on 
the petition, Thomas appeared in court and acknowledged his 
paternity and requested custody of the child if the mother was 
deprived of her parental rights. Subsequent to the hearing 
Thomas filed a separate petition seeking custody and again 
23. 25 Utah 2d 101, 476 P.2d 1013 (1970). 
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acknowledging paternity. The juvenile court held that Thomas 
had "no legal rights to the child11 because he x^ as not the "legal" 
father, and dismissed the petition. 
On appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, Thomas contended that 
he had "acknowledged" the child in court, and that he therefore 
had custodial rights in the child which could not be terminated 
without following the same procedures as were applicable to 
married fathers. The Court's decision began with the observation 
that this was a case of first impression in Utah. The Court 
then proceeded to a discussion of the ancient fictions of nullius 
filius and filius populi3 and noted the common law and statutory 
erosion and eventual abandonment of those fictions and the 
recognition of rights in both the natural mother and, later, 
the natural father: 
. . . At about the same time that the mother came 
to enjoy joint custody with the father of illegitimate 
children, it was commonplace to state that the primary 
right to custody of illegitimate children belongs to 
the mother and that her right is good against all in-
cluding the putative father, or, conversely, the father 
has a custodial right good against all but the mother.24 
The Court then quoted a leading New Jersey case: 
Since the father's duty to support and educate 
the child is to the same extend as if the child 
was born in lawful wedlock, it should follow that 
the father's right to custody should be almost co-
extensive. Thus, while his right is not as great 
as that of the mother, it is certainly far greater 
than that of a stranger. 
24. 476 P.2d at 1015. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-22-
It is clear that the present trend of legal 
and popular thinking is that a willing father of 
an illegitimate child should have a right to custody 
if it is in the best interests of the child, par-
ticularly where the mother has abandoned the child, 
either actually or constructively by surrendering 
the child to an agency for adoption.25 
Finally, the Court's holding on the custody rights of an unwed 
father in Utah was clear and succinct: 
A statutory parent-child relationship has been 
established between the publicly acknowledged 
child and his putative father that places him 
in parity with a legitimate child in rights of 
support, education and inheritance. 
The putative father of an illegitimate child is 
entitled to its custody and control as against 
all but the mother, if he is competent to care 
for and suitable to take charge of the child 
and if it appears that the best interests of 
the child will be thereby secured.26 
In the present case, it is undisputed that the Respondent 
has publicly acknowledged baby girl H _ _ _ as his child. 
Further, the child's mother, Appellant JANA HOPE, has re-
linquished all her rights in and to the child by executing 
her written consent to adoption and placing the child for 
adoption with Appellant L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES. Hence, 
under the rationale of In Re M> the Respondent has a right 
to custody of baby girl H _
 m superior to that of any 
stranger, including Appellant L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES, unless 
25. Id. at 1016, citing In Re Guardianship of C, 98 N.J. 
Super. 474, 237 A.2d 652, 657-58 (1967). 
26. 476 P.2d at 1017. 
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his right are terminated by the juvenile courts, after a 
proper hearing, on the grounds that he is not a fit and 
proper person to have custody of his child. 
Custody, however, is not the issue in this proceeding. 
Respondent is only seeking a determination that his consent 
to any adoption of baby girl H is required. In 1966, 
the Utah adoption statute was amended to read in pertinent 
part: 
A child cannot be adopted without the consent of 
each living parent having rights in relation to 
said . . . . 27 
Clearly the unwed father*s right under In Re M to custody 
of the child, unless he is proven unfit, is a right possessed 
by the parent "in relation to said child" for purposes of the 
statute. The respondent's fitness as a father, and the best 
interests of the child, are not at issue in this proceeding 
because all issues concerning actual custody have been reserved 
for later hearing. Respondent seeks here only a determination 
that he is a "parent having rights in relation to said child," 
and that therefore, baby girl H cannot be placed for 
adoption without his consent unless and until all of his 
parental rights have been judicially terminated. 
Certainly the unwed father should not be required to 
do more to establish his "rights in relation to the child" 
27. §78-30-4, Utah Code Annotated, as amended (1973 Supp.). 
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than was done here. Indeed, it was physically impossible 
to do more. The Court in In Re M held Thomas had "acknowledged" 
baby girl M by public declaration in Court and in a written, 
and presumably verified, petition. Here, in addition to 
acknowledging his paternity under oath by affidavit in this 
declaratory judgment action and in testimony in open court, 
the Respondent offered to marry the natural mother, support 
the child and pay medical expenses associated with its birth, 
or take custody of the child himself. 
Having thus established his rights in relation to baby 
girl H , to the fullest extent possible, the Respondent 
qualifies as a parent whose consent to adoption of the illegiti-
mate child is required. 
POINT III 
AN UNWED FATHER NEED NOT LEGITIMATE HIS ILLEGITI-
MATE CHILD IN ORDER TO BE A PARENT WHOSE CONSENT TO 
ADOPTION IS REQUIRED UNDER §78-30-4, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
AS AMENDED (1973 SUPF.). 
Legitimation unnecessary under Utah law. The position 
that an unwed father must have legitimated his illegitimate 
child in order for his consent to be required for adoption of 
the child stems from the ^re-Stanley rule of law to the effect 
that such a father is not legally a "parent." Precisely the 
same position was advanced by the Utah Attorney General in 
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the state's brief and argument in In Re M3 discussed in 
POINT II, supraj where it was asserted that ff[i]n the context 
of 78-30-4, the father of an illegitimate child is not a 
28 
parent/1 The state argued that the illegitimate father 
must acquire parental rights in relation to the child in 
order to come within the adoption consent statute (§78-30-4), 
either in a judicial proceeding or pursuant to statute. 
As did the U.S. Supreme Court in Stanley3 the Utah Supreme 
Court rejected the fundamental premise that a father is not 
a parent within the contemplation of the law, by its holding 
that such a father has an inherent right to custody second 
only to the right of the mother, unless such right is terminated 
29 
voluntarily or judicially. Hence, since an unwed father is 
already a "parent having rights in relation to" an illegitimate 
child (POINT II, supra); it is immediately apparent that he 
need not legitimize the child in order to establish himself 
as one whose consent to an adoption is required under §78-30-4, 
Utah Code Annotated, as amended (1973 Supp.). 
The Hayes case is consistent with Stanley. Appellants 
30 
cite Commonwealth of Virginia, et al. v. George Hayes, Jr.3 
for its discussion of Stanley. In Hayes, the trial court 
28. In Re M, BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT (State of Utah) at 8. 
29. 476 P.2d at 1018. 
'30. 215 Va. 49, 205 S.E.2d 644 (1974), cited in BRIEF OF 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT at 3. 
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awarded custody of an illegitimate child to its putative father. 
The Virginia Supreme Court reversed, but not on the ground 
that in all instances legitimation is required in order to 
make the illegitimate fatherfs consent necessary to an adoption* 
as is suggested by Appellants1 brief. Instead, the Virginia 
Court reversed a gross misinterpretation of Stanley by the 
trial court: 
In the present case, the trial judge 
apparently was of opinion [sic] that Stanley compelled 
not only a hearing upon the fitness of the putative 
father but also the award of custody to the father 
upon his demand. This is evident from the judge's 
oral opinion. The judge, after stating that the 
father had been flguilty of anti-social, immoral 
and illegal conduct," asked, f,why then is he 
entitled to his child?" The judge answered his 
own query by saying, with obvious reference to 
Stanleys "the supreme court has said he is entitled 
to the child [and] I am going to give the child 
to the father.11 Thus, it is apparent that Stanley 
was misinterpreted and consequently misapplied by 
the trial court. 205 S.E.2d at 647. 
The Virginia Supreme Court's reversal and entry of final judgment 
in favor of the proposed adoptive parents was entirely consonant 
with the Stanley due process requirement, because the trial 
court had already found that Hayes was clearly an unfit father 
and therefore a subsequent hearing on the issue of fitness 
was rendered unnecessary. The Virginia high court noted in 
passing that, " . * * in light of the factual situation here 
presented, unless the child is legitimated by the marriage of 
her parents [citation omitted] before a petition for her adoption 
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is filed, the consent of the father to the adoption will be 
31 
unnecessary." (Emphasis added.) The court noted in conclusion 
that fl. . . whatever may be the application of Stanley, it is 
certain that the decision does not stand for the proposition 
that a putative father who is in fact unfit is nonetheless 
32 
entitled to custody of his child.ff Thus, on its facts, 
Hayes is clearly distinguishable from and inapplicable to the 
present case in which there has been no prior judicial deter-
mination that Respondent is an unfit parent, or any other 
termination of his parental rights in relation to baby girl 
H . 
The Irby line of cases is not applicable. Appellants 
also cite the Irby line of California cases for this notion 
that an illegitimate child must be legitimated before the 
consent of the unwed father will be required to an adoption 
of the child. Yet these cases are inapplicable in the present 
case. First, the Irby line of cases involved a California 
consent statute, similar to the pre-1966 Utah statute, which 
specifically omits the illegitimate father from the list of 
31. 205 S.E.2d at 647. ^ 
32. Id. 
33. In Re Adoption of Irby, 226 Cal. App. 2d 238, 37 Cal. 
Rptr. 879 (1964); Truschke v. LaRocca, 237 Cal. App. 2d 75, 46 
Cal. Rptr. 601 (1965); In Re Adoption of Pierce, 15 Cal. App. 3d 
244, 93 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1971). 
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34 
persons whose consent is required to an adoption. Hence, 
under the California statute3 an illegitimate father must 
become a ''legitimate11 father (by legitimizing the child) in 
order to bring himself within the class of persons whose con-
sent to adoption is required. Since the Utah Legislature 
has specifically rewritten Utah's consent statute to eliminate 
distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate parents, 
this case must be decided under the amended language of our 
present statute, as discussed in POINT II, supra. 
Moreover, the Irby line of cases relied upon by Appellants 
was decided prior to Stanleys and hence did not take into 
account the illegitimate father's now-recognized constitu-
35 
tional rights. A recent California adoption decision dis-
cusses Stanley, and, taking note of the Rothstein and Slawek 
decisions applying Stanley to adoptions, suggests that 
California law may soon fall into line with those decisions: 
. ,
 c Stanley suggests the possibility of 
further development in California law relating 
to paternal rights in illegitimate children, 
not only because of the opinion's emphasis on 
the "essential11 right of a father to raise and 
34. California Civil Code, §224 provides in pertinent part: 
A legitimate child cannot be adopted without the 
consent of its parents if living; . . . nor an 
illegitimate child without the consent of its 
mother if living; . . . 
35. Cheryl Lynn H. v. Superior Court for the County of 
Los Angeles, 41 Cal. App. 3d 273, 115 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1974). 
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his "cognizable and substantial11 interest in 
retaining their custody [citations omitted], 
but also because of its strong implication 
that an illegitimate father who has never had 
custody of his child, is entitled, like other 
parents, to notice and hearing of any proceed-
ing which might bring about a change in legal 
custody of the child*^6 
Stanley recognized constitutional rights which cannot 
be contingent on another person's good will. Most of the 
cases relied upon by Appellants in this proceeding were 
decided prior to Stanley3 and therefore did not recognize 
constitutional rights in the putative father of an illegitimate 
child. Appellants' POINT III, "A CHILD CANNOT BE LEGITIMATED 
WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF ITS MOTHER," is unsupportable in light 
of Stanley. By asserting that the child must be legitimated 
to make the putative father's consent to adoption necessary, 
Appellants seek to make it more difficult for an unwed father 
to obtain standing to assert the "essential" constitutional 
rights recognized in Stanley. By further proposing that the 
unwed mother may, at her discretion, bar legitimation by the 
father, Appellants seek to make it impossible for the father 
to obtain standing, thereby effectively divesting him of the 
"essential" constitutional rights of Due Process and Equal 
Protection recognized in Stanley. Surely an individual in 
this country may not be divested of rights of constitutional 
stature at the whim of another individual. Such a holding 
36. 115 Cal. Rptr. at 852. 
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would vitiate Stanleys along with most of the great strides 
forward in recent years by the United States Supreme Court 
in the areas of civil rights and equal protection. Following 
the recognition of constitutional rights in the putative 
father in Stanleys earlier decisions, such as those relied 
upon by Appellants here, can no longer be viewed as controlling, 
to the extent that they would abrogate such constitutional 
rights. 
POINT IV 
IF UTAH'S ADOPTION STATUTE IS NOT INTERPRETED 
TO REQUIRE THE NATURAL FATHER'S CONSENT TO THE ADOPTION 
OF AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD, THEN THE STATUTE MUST BE FOUND 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN LIGHT OF STANLEY v. ILLINOIS. 
If the finding of the trial court is reversed, and it is 
found that under Utah law, even where the unwed father has 
openly and formally acknowledged his paternity, his consent to 
the adoption of his illegitimate child is not required, then 
the Utah statute, §78-30-4, Utah Code Annotated, as amended 
(1973 Suppo), must be found unconstitutional under the holding 
and reasoning in Stanley v. Illinois^ Under Stanley* the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that an unwed 
father be afforded a fair hearing before his parental rights 
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(such as the custody right established under Utah law in In Re M) 
can be terminated. Further, such a father is denied the consti-
tutionally guaranteed Equal Protection under the law if his consent 
to an adoption is not required under the same circumstances in 
which the consent of an unwed mother, or a married father or 
mother, would be required* 
As discussed in POINT I, supra* there is clear precedent 
for a finding that a state adoption statute is unconstitutional 
under Stanley. The Wisconsin Supreme Court made such a finding 
in Rothstein* and in Slawek the Illinois Supreme Court which 
decided Stanley overturned that state1s adoption and paternity 
statutes to the extent that they conflicted with Stanley. 
CONCLUSION 
It is undisputed that the Respondent is in fact the father 
of baby girl H , and that he has at all times publicly 
acknowledged his paternity. Respondent has done all that he 
possibly could to assume his parental duties and legitimate 
the child. He offered to marry the child's natural mother, 
Appellant JANA HOPE, but was refused. He offered to pay the 
medical bills occasioned by the pregnancy and birth, and 
offered to take the child into his home, but Appellant L.D.S. 
SOCIAL SERVICES refused to even disclose the whereabouts of 
the child, and secretly placed the child with prospective adoptive 
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parents without Respondent's knowledge or consent. Clearly, 
under these facts, and the holdings in Stanley v. Illinois 
and In Re M3 Respondent is a "living parent having rights in 
relation to [the] child" within the purview of Utah's adoption 
consent statute, §78-30-4, Utah Code Annotated, as amended 
(1973 Supp.). A contrary ruling would deprive Respondent of 
the essential constitutional guarantees of Due Process and 
Equal Protection recognized in Stanley, Respondent therefore 
respectfully urges affirmance of the trial court's determina-
tion in this declaratory judgment action. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JL (A 
HAROLD A. HINT2E for 
STRONG, POELMAN & FOX 
2000 The Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Served two (2) copies of the foregoing 
Brief on Appellants by delivering them 
to F. Briton McConkie at 336 South 
Third East, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
/•7tU day of June, 1975. 
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APPENDIX 
The putative father's consent is required for the ter-
mination of his parental rights and adoption of his illegiti-











If the father has established his paternity. 
Ala. Code tit. 27, §3 (1958). 
If the putative father has established parentage. 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §8-103 (Supp. 1972). 
If the father has established his paternity. 
Ark. Stat. Ann. §56-106 (1971). 
If, prior to the adoption decree, the father 
has acknowledged the child as his own. Colo. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§22-1-3, 22-4-1 (Supp. 1974). 
Unless the putative father has been given 
notice and his parental rights terminated. 
Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. §45-61i(b)(2) (Supp. 
1974). 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, §908(2)(a) (Supp. 1974). 
Unless the mother of the child does not know 
the father's identity, and a reasonable search 
would not reveal his identity. Fla. Stat. Ann. 
§63.062(l)(b) (Supp. 1974). 
If the father has established paternity, supported 
the child, and the court has his address or 
can located him without an expenditure exceed-
ing five dollars. Ind. Ann. Stat. §3-120 (Supp. 
1972). 
Consent is required of the parent "having the 
care and providing for the wants of the child." 
Iowa Code Ann. §600.3 (Supp. 1973). 
If the paternity is established in a legal 
action, or if an affidavit is filed stating 
that the affiant is the father of the child. 
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §199.500 (Supp. 1974). 
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If the child has been formally acknowledged 
or legitimated by the father. La. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. §9:404 (1965). 
Upon the filing of an affidavit by the child's 
mother, the judge will make a factual determina-
tion, and decide whether it is necessary to re-
quire that the father be given notice and 20 
days in which to petition for custody of the 
child. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, §532 
(Supp. 1974). 
If the unwed father has filed notice of intent 
to claim paternity. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§710.3a (Supp. 1973). 
The statute does not require consent from the 
putative father of an illegitimate child. 
Minn. Stat. Ann. §259.24 (1971). The case law, 
however, is contra: In ve Shady, 118 N.W.2d 
449 (Minn. 1962). The putative father who 
promptly acknowledges paternity and expresses 
interest in his child is entitled to notice 
and hearing of all proceedings. In ve Brennan, 
134N.W.2dl26 (Minn. 1965). 
If the unwed father has established his parental 
rights in the proper court. Nev. Rev. Stat. 
§127.040 (1967). 
If the child is established to be the putative 
father's child by his acknowledgment or by a 
court proceeding, or if the father adopts the 
child. N. M. Stat. Ann. §22-2-25 (Supp. 1973). 
If the father's paternity is formally established. 
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §60.5 (1966). 
R. I. Gen. Laws Ann. §15-7-5 (Supp. 1972). 
S. D. Compiled Laws Ann. §25-6-4 (Supp. 1973). 
There must be a decree terminating the parent-
child relationship as to each living parent 
of the illegitimate child before any petition 
for adoption of the child may be considered. 
Vern. Tex. Codes Ann., Family Code, §16.03(b) 
(Supp. 1974). 
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Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4 (Supp. 1973). 
Unless the putative father's identity is not 
reasonably ascertainable, or he is given notice 
by mail to last known address and fails to 
object within 21 days. Va. Code Ann. §63.1-225 
(Supp. 1974). 
Consent is required of both parents, unless 
they have been given notice and have not con-
tested the adoption prior to entry of the 
interlocutory decree of adoption. Wash. Rev. 
Code Ann. §§26.32.30, 26.32.40 (Supp. 1974). 
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